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This issue of the Eastern Buddhist is a memorial to Nishitani Keiji, an 
occasion to remember the man, his life, his thought. A memorial is 
meant to be a tribute to him, but in effect it is as much about us who 
memorialize, for it is a recollection of our being with him. Perhaps our 
memories expose us, myself included, more than they reveal him.
We all, I think, connect Nishitani Keiji to Zen. Before I had any ex­
perience with Zen, I envisioned it as a way to connect everyday bodily 
existence with philosophical reflection. My vision soon proved to be 
short of reality. My first experience with Zen practice, during a seven- 
day sesshin, shrank the entire world to a body of intense pain and left 
no room for philosophical thinking. On the other hand, my first 
readings of “Zen philosophy” were either baffling old Chinese anec­
dotes (kOan) or abstruse, highly abstract speculation (Nishida philos­
ophy), both far removed from my everyday life. Later I tried to make 
the connection by spending days struggling to read an essay, “The 
Standpoint of Zen,”1 at a time when I could read it only once re­
moved, by translating it. When I first met the author of that essay, 
Professor Nishitani Keiji, at his home at the foot of Yoshida mountain 
in Kyoto in 1978, I began to understand that the connection between 
everyday existence and philosophical reflection cannot be contrived, 
but must be lived. Nishitani Sensei showed me this indirectly, by direct­
ing attention away from his life, to the matter of his thought.




The connection between philosophical reflection and everyday activi­
ty is traditionally signified by the word “practice.” This term has a 
complex history in western philosophy but often a simple connotation. 
Practice is the application of a principle or theory to a concrete activi­
ty. By practice we apply what we think to what we do. And what we do 
usually has a certain intent or goal. Through practice we become 
“good at” something; and something is practical if it is “good for” 
something else. In common usage, then, practice takes its meaning 
from something outside of practice: the theory or principle to be ap­
plied; the objective or goal to be attained. Furthermore, practice is 
understood as a kind of activity that only human beings can engage in, 
insofar as only humans are capable of willful intention.
Taking this understanding of practice for granted, I was immediately 
baffled when I read in an essay by Nishitani that clouds moving across 
the sky, water flowing, leaves falling, and blossoms scattering are all 
forms of practice. They are, more exactly, “forms of non-form,” that 
is, of selflessness. To practice is to adopt the form of non-form as the 
form of the self.2 Nishitani’s text, Religion and Nothingness in English 
translation, formulates the point carefully. It does not present these 
examples of practice as an analogy, as if to say that when we truly 
practice, we are “like” moving clouds, flowing water, falling leaves, 
scattering blossoms. Such an analogy would compare, but at the same 
time differentiate between, human activities and natural occurrences. 
Rather, Nishitani suggests that their form and our form are in practice 
the same “form of non-form.” Here again, the text does not simply 
repeat the Buddhist teaching that such natural phenomena in them­
selves are empty, devoid of svabhQva or self-subsistent being, nor does 
it say that by practicing we come to see the emptiness of things. 
True to the point he is making, Nishitani’s language here makes no 
distinction between us and them; it posits no forms as things outside 
the self. It does use verbal parts of speech and focuses on activities in 
its examples: clouds moving, water flowing. In this respect it would 
seem to make some connection with the ordinary notion of practice, 
which after all is a kind of activity. But the activities in Nishitani’s ex­
amples neither arise from a willful self nor are they directed toward 
2 ShakyO to wa nanika (Tokyo, 1961), p. 220; Religion and Nothingness, translated 
by Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 200.
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something else, and so they run counter to the usual instrumental un­
derstanding of what practice is. Clouds moving and water flowing are 
themselves without will and intent, and are not aimed at any goal.
Perhaps the discrepancy arises because we are trying to convey two 
different meanings with the same word, “practice.” In his discussion, 
Nishitani is clarifying a passage by Hakuin, who in turn uses the cited 
examples in a comment about the occurrence of the word “practice” in 
the Heart Sutra: Avalokitdvara Bodhisattva is engaged in the practice 
of deep prajfiaparamiti. The relevant word is fr (gyd in Japanese; hsing 
in Chinese), a term literally meaning “going” that is often translated 
as practice in Sino-Japanese Buddhist texts. The opening passage of 
the Heart Sutra speaks of AvalokiteSvara “moving in the deep course 
of the Wisdom which has gone beyond,” as Edward Conze literally 
translates the Sanskrit text.3 Conze equates this practicing with con­
templating emptiness or nirvana. To be sure, the Bodhisattva is com­
passionate and does not enter final nirvana, but Conze’s reading sug­
gests that to be engaged in the practice of this wisdom is already to 
realize nirvana. Although Nishitani refers neither to the Sanskrit text 
nor to Conze’s interpretation, he too suggests a sense of practice that 
includes realization. Hence in his interpretation of the opening of 
the Heart Sutra he can cite passages by DOgen that play upon the 
simultaneity of practice and realization (#& shusho). It would appear, 
then, that Nishitani’s notion of fr is confined to some very particular in­
stances and hardly represents the kind of practices that are applications 
of a theory or are directed toward a goal.
3 Edward Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958), 
p. 77.
4 Religion and Nothingness, pp. 120-2; ShQkyO to wa nanika, pp. 137-8. Jan Van 
Bragt’s revised translation usually renders fj as “observance,** to distinguish it from W
“praxis”; see his glossary, p. 300. On page 121 of the translation, however, where
In fact, many Buddhist texts use the term fi to denote a practical ac­
tivity or exercise engaged in by a person (or personified being) in order 
to gain something other than the activity itself. Thus many traditional 
occurrences of the word seem to have the instrumental sense of the 
English word “practice” that is conveyed by the modem Japanese 
term ‘Z&jissen. Nishitani himself initiates the discussion of the stand­
point of practice earlier in his book by using the terms and f? inter­
changeably.4 His language there at first suggests a method to “get di­
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rectly in touch with the reality of things.” He then raises the question 
of how such a method or practice could be possible as long as it in­
volves a [willful] subject trying to reach an objective world, or as long 
as its theory reduces both of these to merely material or merely ideal ex­
istence. He then presents the possibility of non-instrumental practice, 
an “action of non-action,” that opens “a field where things would 
become manifest in their suchness.” But Nishitani is not contrasting 
different kinds of practices and determining which of them affords ac­
cess to the reality of things. Rather he proposes that there is a “field” 
(« ba) wherein all things and practices become manifest as they are, 
and this he calls the “field of emptiness.” He implies that tacit 
metaphysical presuppositions such as the subjectivity, objectivity, 
materialism or idealism of self and things are what determine our un­
derstanding of activity or practice, even social praxis. Hence, it seems 
to me, Nishitani is talking not about two different kinds of practice but 
about various understandings of practice, one of which presents (but 
does not represent) religious exercises and clouds moving, or water 
flowing, in the same light.* 35
Nishitani’s text shifts from WK to ?t, Van Bragt retains “praxis” for both.
3 I have elaborated on the non-represcntational and non-instrumental view of prac­
tice in an earlier article, “The Hermeneutics of Practice in DOgen and Francis of
Assisi,” Eastern Buddhist xiv, 2 (Autumn 1981), pp. 30-32.
6 For a penetrating analysis of DOgen’s conceptual heritage and of problems concern­
ing the description of the non-dual Ch’an dharma that transcends the distinction be­
tween theory and cultivation, sec Carl Bielefeldt, DOgen's Manuals of Zen Meditation 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), especially pp. 161-63.
Nishitani’s interpretation of religious practice has a precedent not 
only in Hakuin’s comment but also in statements by Ddgen that 
Nishitani does not mention. In the SansuikyO chapter of ShObdgenzO, 
for example, DOgen writes that “because water practices and confirms 
water, there is a study where water expounds water”
0). In this passage, DOgen’s word for prac­
tice is the first half of his famous compound ttfgg “practice-confirm” or 
“practice-realize,” and so it already indicates an understanding of prac­
tice that does not posit a separate goal. Confirmation/realization is 
already incorporated in practice. Indeed this notion of non-dual 
cultivation can be traced back to early Ch’an texts in China, alongside 
texts that clearly retain a goal-oriented sense of religious practices.6 
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Yet it is still startling to read in DOgen of water practicing-confirming 
itself, for water is usually represented as a substance incapable of self­
cultivation. It is incapable of anything except being water, by virtue of 
all other things—and perhaps that is DOgen’s point. Similarly, Nishi- 
tani may be using Hakuin’s examples of the formless forms of practice 
to give our expectations a jolt. With these precedents in mind, we see 
that there is nothing original in Nishitani’s extension of practice to 
forms not ordinarily covered by this concept. What is innovative in 
Nishitani’s exposition is the view that the different senses of practice 
must be clarified in terms of the respective fields in which they emerge, 
and that the standpoint of emptiness provides the field wherein all 
others, and all senses of practice, become manifest for what they are.
Nishitani’s exposition can throw light on many questions of practice 
that he does not expressly consider. Indeed, his mention of both 
Hakuin and DOgen in the same context clarifies a basis common to two 
Zen figures whose views of practice are usually contrasted with one 
another. In the usual interpretation, Hakuin reviles mere sitting in 
zazen and insists on the breakthrough of kensho, seeing one’s true 
nature; whereas DOgen is the champion of shikantaza, just sitting, with 
no mind or intention to gain enlightenment. Which, one may ask, is 
the true practice of Zen? Nishitani’s text displaces this question by point­
ing out the quality of practice common to both Hakuin and DOgen, 
the quality we might call non-contrivance. For neither is practice (fr) 
to be taken as a form contrived by the self. Stepping beyond the 
boundaries of the Zen tradition, I wonder whether one might revisit 
the meaning of Shinran’s denial of practice in light of Nishitani’s 
emphasis. Shinran denies the efficacy of any practice that is self­
motivated, and so raises questions about what sort of practice the 
recitation of the nembutsu is, if it can be called practice at all. For 
Shinran, only the enlightened mind of the Buddha has saving power; 
one practices to no avail. In general, the Pure Land Buddhist way of 
“other power” tariki) is sharply contrasted with Zen’s way of 
“self-power” (g/j jiriki). Notwithstanding the historical conse­
quences of this perceived difference, the quality of non-contrivance sug­
gested by Nishitani’s interpretation would seem to provide a common 
ground for understanding both ways, specifically both Shinran’s denial 
and DOgen’s and Hakuin’s advocacy of practice. I think this would be 
an “ecumenical” avenue worth exploring. The question to be asked of
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both sides is: Who practices? Who recites the nembutsu'l Who prac­
tices zazen? Nishitani’s interpretation again displaces this question by 
implying that self is not foremost the practitioner but rather what is 
practiced.
Practice involves the question not only of who practices and what is 
practiced, but also of the place of practice. Here Nishitani’s language 
directs our attention from the physical location of practice to its place 
in the scheme of things. This ontological place he also calls the place of 
“self-joyous samadhi,” invoking DOgen’s use of a Yogacara term. 
Nishitani’s understanding of samadhi in general is another example of 
his innovative thinking.
Samadhi is a practice central to Buddhism. The term actually applies 
to a large number of different practices that have to do with mental con­
centration. It is common to think of all the various samadhi as states of 
mind, sometimes as trance states. Traditional descriptions in both the 
literature of Buddhism and pre-Buddhist Yoga support this under­
standing. The Buddha sitting under the Bodhi tree is said to have pro­
gressed through four such states, technically dhyOnas, immediately 
before his enlightenment, and numerous arhats, bodhisattvas and 
masters are depicted as entering one samadhi or another.
It is true that many descriptions make it difficult to think of some­
one, some self, as being in a particular state. In the third dhyana of 
the Buddha’s progression, for example, both self-consciousness and 
concentration on external objects have disappeared; and in the fourth 
dhyana there is said to be no trace of self at all. The fourth state is thus 
aptly called the body of the Tathagata, but it is also considered a state 
of equanimity, which in some sense still implies a mental state. If there 
is no self in such states, the implication is that at least there is some 
mind involved. Philosophically, that assumption also turns out to be 
problematic in some literature, for the disappearance of any con­
sciousness directed to self or things would seem to rule out speaking 
of a mind. There is even a state of “cessation,” whose attainment 
(nirodhasamapatti) in an eighth and final dhyana eliminates all mental 
functions.7 Some texts depict the Buddha attaining this state before his
7 For an analysis of problems related to the “attainment of cessation,’* see the in­
vestigation of Paul J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 
1986). That this thorough study remains uncritically bound to a language of “altered 
states of consciousness’’ is an indication of how radical and revealing Nishitani’s refor-
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parinirvana, although they question the value of this and other trance 
states for the attainment of liberation. Notwithstanding these difficul­
ties, however, the traditional descriptions, particularly when read in 
contemporary translations, overwhelmingly give the impression that 
the central practice of samadhi in its various forms refers to some­
one entering a mental state of concentration, meditation, or trance. 
This impression is not diminished by the Buddhist schemes that place 
samadhi as the eighth part of the eightfold path to liberation, or as the 
fifth param ita or perfection. There too samadhi seems to refer primari­
ly to a state of mind, enjoyed by beings with mental capacity.
It is therefore somewhat startling to read in Nishitani’s Religion and 
Nothingness of burning fire being in its fire-samadhi, or of a falling 
leaf, flying bird, or swimming fish, as manifestations of “samadhi­
being.”8 Samadhi is not ordinarily attributed to things like fire, birds, 
and fish. Nishitani’s text softens the surprise a bit by playing on the 
traditional Sino-Japanese character for samadhi, $ jo. The Japanese 
verbal compound i (sadamaru) has the meaning of being settled in 
a position. For Nishitani this meaning naturally suggests being 
gathered together or concentrated, not scattered, as the mind would be 
in a state of samadhi. The meanings associated with the character 
thus allow Nishitani to interpret a state of mind as a state of being. 
Samadhi-being is the mode of being or form of something as it is, deter­
mining it as the definite ofc) thing it uniquely is. Accordingly, it 
designates the “sheer definition feigz) of the selfness of a thing.”9
mulation of samadhi is.
• Religion and Nothingness, pp. 128; 139; ShQkyO to wa nanika, pp. 145, 157.
9 Religion and Nothingness, p. 129; ShakyO to wa nanika, p. 146.
There are three points to notice regarding Nishitani’s notion of 
samadhi-being. First is the active character of his examples: a fire burn­
ing, a leaf falling, a fish swimming, a bird flying, all exemplify things in 
activity. A thing’s “being settled in its own position” paradoxically 
takes the form of the distinctive activity of the thing; it “is” itself by 
“doing” something. Secondly, what a definite thing does, it does not 
do to itself, and thus it can be itself. Fire does not burn fire and 
therefore it can burn other things and be fire. This formulation alludes 
to the soku-hi jy# logic made famous by D. T. Suzuki, and would 
seem to apply only to activities that are expressed by transitive verbs 
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such as bum. Despite this grammatical delimitation that neither Suzuki 
nor Nishitani take into account, the point here is that a thing can be 
itself only in interdependence with other things, and can be defined 
only in reference to other things. Nishitani’s examples suggest there­
fore that a thing in its samadhi-being, its “own home-ground,” is 
neither settled in a static position nor does it exist independently “in- 
itself”. This second point connects Nishitani’s notion to samadhi as 
the concentrated state in which ego or self is forgotten, although he em­
phasizes that samadhi is an ontological concept and not simply a 
psychological one.10 Thirdly, this active state of being can define the 
true (formless) form of things because it includes the full range of their 
manifestations. Thus, for example, the psychological self is not always 
concentrated, but “no matter how dispersed the conscious self is, its 
self as it is in itself is ever in samadhi,” or more precisely, “that dis­
persed mode of being, such as it is, is samadhi.”11 Hence Nishitani 
thinks of samadhi not as a state of mind that one enters into, as if from 
the outside, but as the state of being that allows all psychological states 
of mind to manifest themselves. One cannot “enter” that within which 
one already is. On the other hand, many Zen texts and sermons suggest 
that the self actually emerges from a state of samadhi, and that one 
breaks “out of” samadhi. But Nishitani’s language seems to say that 
both “entering into” and “breaking out of” occur within one’s 
samadhi-being.
10 I use the term “ontological” guardedly; it covers not only Nishitani’s “field of 
beings” but also the fields of nihility and of emptiness.
11 Religion and Nothingness, p. 165; Shaky0 to wa nanika, p. 185.
Are there precedents to Nishitani’s notion of samadhi-being within 
Buddhist literature? D. T. Suzuki cites an example which could be 
taken to illustrate the third point above. Around 723 C.E., Zen Master 
Tai-yung visits Master Chih-huang, who is renowned for his ability to 
enter into a samadhi. Yung questions Huang:
“At the time of such entrances, is it supposed that your con­
sciousness still continues, or that you are in a state of un­
consciousness? If your consciousness still continues, all sen­
tient beings are endowed with consciousness and can enter 
into a samadhi like yourself. If, on the other hand, you are in 
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a state of unconsciousness, plants and rocks can enter into a 
samadhi.”
Hung replies: “When I enter into a samadhi, I am not con­
scious of either condition.”
Yung says: “If you are not conscious of either condition, this 
is abiding in eternal samadhi, and there can be neither enter­
ing into a samadhi nor rising out of it.”12
12 D.T. Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of No Mind (London: Rider and Company, 1969), 
pp. 34-35. I have not been able to locate this story in other sources.
13 An example of a shift from the meaning of “enter” to that of “be enlightened to” 
in the context of samAdhi can be found in a Northern Ch'an School document 
translated by John McRae in his The Northern School and the Formation of Early 
Ch’an Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), pp. 186-87.
This passage continues to speak of Buddha-nature as all-inclusive, and 
Suzuki himself uses it to make the point that meditation must be 
understood as non-dual, not a means to the end of emancipation. This 
point ties in with the non-instrumental view of practice mentioned 
above, but I think this dialogue also undermines the prevalent notion 
of samadhi as a state of mind that one can enter and exit. To be sure, 
the term A5£ (nyfljO}, or entering samadhi, does occur in Buddhist 
texts, but there are other usages of A that might better be rendered “to 
be enlightened to,” such as A£#, enlightened to the dharmadhatu, 
where this last term indicates the whole universe in which we already 
are.13 This sort of example might therefore serve as textual evidence for 
the third part of Nishitani’s interpretation of samadhi. There is 
nothing new in the second point concerning the interdependence and 
selflessness of things, or the first point defining things in terms of ac­
tivities; both of these points are amply illustrated in Zen dialogues and 
kdan, among other Buddhist texts. What is new, to my knowledge, is 
the designation “samadhi-being” and the ontological shift it occa­
sions.
Nishitani’s neologism is more than a metaphoric extension of a state 
of mental concentration in which self is forgotten and the practitioner 
is “like” a fire burning, a fish swimming, a leaf falling. Presumably, 
whenever we talk about samadhi, we are still referring to a state or 
states of mind cultivated by people (or personifications). I think that 
Nishitani’s innovative term “samadhi-being” challenges this presump­
16
PRACTICE, SAMADHI, REALIZATION
tion by exposing the metaphysical priority that underlies it. We natural­
ly presume that first of all there exist people, or representations of peo­
ple, who subsequently achieve a certain state of mind. That transitory 
state might then be compared to things that we experience—a fire burn­
ing, a leaf falling, etc. Nishitani would consider this sort of description 
an objectification, a kind of representational thinking from a par­
ticular and limited standpoint. There is no reason not to presume in­
stead that a samadhi is a be-ing and that people and other things are 
manifestations of that be-ing. Nishitani’s “samadhi-being” or “posi­
tion” is meant to represent, in his own words, “the non-objectifiable 
mode of being of a thing as it is in itself.”14 15In effect, his terms repre­
sent this by not representing things as self-sufficient identities, that is, 
by unsettling beings from their place in a substantialist metaphysics, 
and by unsettling our expectation that samadhi is foremost a 
psychological state. Fire too is “in” samadhi by burning, but not burn­
ing itself, i.e., by not being fire.
14 Religion and Nothingness, p. 189; ShakyO to *>a nanika, p. 210.
15 ShObOgenzO Sammai O Sammai, translated as “The King of Samadhis Samadhi*’ 
by Norman Waddell & Abe Masao, Eastern Buddhist vn, 1 (May 1974), pp. 118, 121.
Nishitani applies his ontological understanding of samadhi particu­
larly to passages from various fascicles of DOgen’s ShObOgenzO. He 
identifies DOgen’s “Samadhi that is the King of Samadhis” with 
samadhi-being, and again implies that this King Samadhi refers not 
primarily to a mental state cultivated by sitting practice but rather to 
the activity of the actual world. DOgen himself expressly identifies the 
King of Samadhis as sitting crosslegged. It is easy to read his text sim­
ply as an exhortation to practice singleminded “crosslegged sitting” to 
the exclusion of all else. The impression that even DOgen considers this 
King of Samadhis a state of mind is strengthened when he writes that at 
the very time of sitting you should exhaustively examine 
various matters, and that “if you wish to realize samadhi, if you wish 
to enter samadhi, put all your wandering thoughts and various 
discords and disorders to rest. Practice in this way and you enter into 
realization of the King of Samadhis Samadhi.”’5 It is true that this im­
pression is challenged by other statements in the text, that there is a 
difference between mind sitting, body sitting, and sitting with body and 
mind cast off, for example. And DOgen implies an ontological under-
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standing in his statements that this crosslegged sitting is a total realm ft 
(hence not a particular psychological state), and is the body of 
suchness, the mind of suchness, the buddhas and patriarchs in their 
suchness, etc. But Nishitani undermines the
psychological interpretation more clearly in his mention of “crossleg­
ging the King Samadhi” in which there is “neither mind nor 
thing nor Buddha.”16 To support his reading further, he might also 
have referred to DOgen’s Kaiin zammai, “Ocean Reflection Samadhi,” 
whose opening statement might be translated: “All the buddhas and 
patriarchs, just as they are, are without fail the ocean-reflection- 
samadhi. ”17 Thus there clearly are precedents to Nishitani’s on­
tological interpretation of a Buddhist practice often taken to be simply 
a matter of mental concentration. Nishitani’s neologism “samadhi-be­
ing” articulates this interpretation in modem terms and presses us to ex­
amine our own psychologists assumptions in translating certain texts. 
I think that it would be fruitful for scholars to explore further whether 
and where the ontological understanding of samadhi helps to clarify 
Buddhist texts and practices.
Consonant with Nishitani’s interpretations of practice and samadhi 
is his view of realization. In the context of discussions of Buddhist prac­
tice, we often take “realization” to mean the awakening of the practi­
tioner, an achievement of the individual or at least something that hap­
pens to him or her. Nishitani subverts this usual impression in the first 
chapter of his book. There he is concerned with explaining his ap­
proach to understanding religion, an approach in terms of the “self- 
awareness of reality” By this he means “both our becom­
ing aware of reality and, at the same time, the reality realizing itself in 
our awareness.”18 Writing in Japanese, he draws upon the dual mean­
ing of the English “realize” (to actualize and to understand), in order 
to clarify his point. When we understand something in Nishitani’s 
sense, we appropriate it such that it realizes (actualizes) itself in us. On
’6 Religion and Nothingness, p. 189; ShQkyb to wa nanika, p. 211.
” Hee-Jin Kim emphasizes the ontological dimension even more in his translation: 
“The manner in which buddhas and ancestors exist is necessarily ocean-reflection 
samadhi.'* He notes that “samadhi in DOgen’s thought is preeminently ontological 
and soteriological, not psychological.** See his Flowers of Emptiness: Selections from 
DOgen’s ShObOgenzO (Lewiston/Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), pp. 167, 171.
” Religion and Nothingness, p. 5; ShQkyO to wa nanika, pp. 8-9.
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the other hand, Nishitani would not say that we who appropriate are 
prior and privileged subjects on whom reality is dependent. He is not 
advocating philosophical idealism. Quite the contrary: subjectivity is 
realized in one way through the realization of its nihility. The term for 
“realization” here, § jit, primarily connotes awakening and recogni­
tion. But Nishitani adds the second sense when he writes that “realiza­
tion of the self itself’ involves becoming that nihihty,
“and in so doing becompng] aware of itself from the limits of self­
existence.”19 Subjectivity is actualized in this kind of radical question­
ing. Such existential questions return to reality our attempt to
19 Religion and Nothingness, pp. 16-17; ShQkyO to wa nanika, pp. 22-23.
20 Despite his existential interests, Nishitani does not locate the essence of religion in 
“the individual’s experience,” as his critic Paul Griffiths would have it (“On the Possi­
ble Future of the Buddhist-Christian Interaction,” in Japanese Buddhism, ed. Minoru 
Kiyota, Tokyo/Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International, 1987, p. 155). On the con­
trary, Nishitani’s view of realization suggests a critique of subjectivistic and experien­
tial reductions of religion. If we are to follow Griffiths’ agenda and test the truth of 
Nishitani’s propositions, we need first to pay heed to the meaning of their terms.
21 Religion and Nothingness, p. 163; ShQkyO to wa nanika, p. 183.
22 Religion and Nothingness, p. 199; ShQkyO to wa nanika, p. 219.
understand religion, from Nishitani’s perspective.20
Nishitani takes up the theme of the self-realization of reality again 
when he speaks of samadhi-being and practice. Things are “manifest 
in their suchness,” and “realize themselves nonobjectively” in their 
samadhi-being.21 It is not that they are manifest to a subjective self, for 
Nishitani could as easily say that self is manifest to things. Later he 
quotes DOgen’s famous line from the GenjOkOan: “To forget one’s self 
is to be confirmed by all dharmas.”22 In an ontology where “all things 
come forward and practice and confirm the self,” neither the 
subjective self nor objective reality are recognized. Nishitani calls this 
place the point where the “world worlds,” alluding to Heidegger’s 
phrase that undermines any idealism or realism. He might also have 
mentioned DOgen’s water that practices-realizes ptself as] water. 
And doubtlessly, his talk of the self-awareness (or self-realization) of 
reality reflects the philosophy of his teacher, Nishida, who wrote of a 
self-aware place and world. Nishitani’s view once again has
precedents. But his interpretation is distinctive for its power to expose 
subjectivist assumptions about the meaning of religious realization.
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In its own way, his philosophy contains parallels to contemporary 
western critiques of psychologism and subjectivity. Yet unlike them he 
holds that existential concerns, not conceptual dead-ends, give rise to 
the philosophically important questions. These questions then must be 
returned to the reality of pressing personal issues if the subject is to be 
truly negated.
Nishitani Keiji, as I knew him, was a man who never appeared 
pressed for time. He took things as they came, moment by moment. 
In seemingly endless hours of discussion with him, he never made me 
feel as if my questions were unwelcome. What scant understanding of 
his notion of “the absolute present” I have, I have from sitting in his 
presence. To speak of him is to speak of the past, but not simply 
because he has passed away. He always turned the talk away from 
himself, to the issue at hand. If my questions were existential, he re­
turned them to me; if they were academic, he turned them into exis­
tential questions. What could be less fitting a tribute to the selflessness 
I experienced in him than a eulogy of his person.
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